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Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact corporate governance, 
measured by a governance index, on the performance of listed firms in a developing 
economy, Ghana. It also evaluates the effect of the introduction of a code of corporate 
governance on compliance rates across Ghanaian firms as well as assessing the impact of the 
code’s introduction on firm performance for the study period 2000 to 2009.  
Design/methodology/approach – The paper develops a Ghanaian corporate governance 
index (GCGI) containing 33 provisions to measure corporate governance quality during the 
pre-code and the post-code sub-periods. The authors use a panel data analytical framework 
and fixed effects regressions to analyse the governance-performance relationships.  
Findings –After controlling for endogeneity, we find a statistically significant and positive 
relationship between the GCGI and firm performance. The analysis shows evidence of a 
statistically significant increase in the degree of compliance with the Ghanaian Code from the 
pre-2003 sub-period to the post-2003 sub-period. We also find that the introduction of the 
code has led to improved firm performance. However, not all elements of corporate 
governance appear to have a significant effect on firm performance.  
Research limitations/implications – One limitation of this study is the development of a 
corporate governance index. The binary coding used to construct the GCGI may not reflect 
the relative importance of the different corporate governance provisions. This means that all 
elements included in the index are given equal weighting. Future research may assign weights 
to each of the corporate governance provisions but this may have the disadvantage of making 
subjective judgements relative to the importance of each corporate governance provision 
recommended by the Ghanaian Code. 
 
Practical implications – These results have important implications for both policy makers 
and companies. For policy makers, it is encouraging for the development of a code of 
corporate governance to regulate firms rather than enforcing rigid laws that may not be value 
relevant. For companies, the improvement in compliance with a code of corporate 
governance can provide a means of achieving improved performance.    
 
Originality/value – This paper adds to the limited evidence on the governance-performance 
relationship in developing economies and in particular it analyses the role of a governance 
index. It is also the first paper to compare the pre-code and the post-code governance index-
performance relationship in an African or developing country.  
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1. Introduction 
There have been many studies into the relationship between good corporate 
governance and company performance in developed economies, for example, Gompers et al 
(2003), Klein et al (2005) and Renders et al (2010). However, it has also been argued that 
good corporate governance is particularly important for developing economies (McGee, 
2010; Agyemang et al, 2013; Robertson et al, 2013). Developing economies tend to face 
issues that are different to those encountered in developed economies. Gurgler et al (2003) 
argue that developing economies are more likely to have weaker corporate governance 
institutions than developed economies and will therefore experience less effective monitoring 
of management. Robelo and Vasconcelos (2002) identify weak legal systems, poor investor 
protection and illiquid capital markets as specific problems faced by developing economies. 
Consequently, it becomes difficult for firms in developing economies with weak corporate 
governance to attract the capital necessary to create a growing and vibrant economy (Okpara, 
2011). The increasing globalisation of the world economy, coupled with the growth of codes 
of good governance in the developed world, has made it important that the developing 
countries also foster the conditions under which good governance can flourish.  
The impact of corporate governance on developing economies is therefore an 
important indicator of a country’s attractiveness to potential investors. Many developed 
economies have introduced governance codes, for example, the UK where the Cadbury 
Committee (1992) was the precursor to the UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) and the 
King Report I (1994), II (2002) and III (2009) for South Africa. In addition, countries such as 
the US have their own systems of governance based not on voluntary codes but on a 
combination of capital market regulation and legal requirements. The importance attached to 
corporate governance is also reflected by the fact that an international organisation such as 
the Organisation for Economic Corporation and Development (OECD) has published its own 
set of governance principles highlighting transparency, accountability, board oversight, and a 
respect for the rights of shareholders and role of key stakeholders as being central to a well-
functioning corporate governance system (OECD, 2004). The world-wide interest in 
governance is shown by the fact that the European Corporate Governance Institute lists over 
90 countries as having a governance system in place at the end of 2014.  
This paper makes a number of contributions to the debate about the impact of 
corporate governance on firm performance in a developing economy, Ghana. First, there has 
been limited analysis of the effect of corporate governance changes on firm performance in 
developing economies. Ghana makes a particularly useful country to investigate because the 
Security and Exchange Commission Ghana (SECG) introduced corporate governance 
guidelines (hereafter the Ghanaian Code) in 2003 with which all Ghanaian listed firms were 
encouraged to comply. Second, the analysis builds on the view that a governance index, one 
that captures a range of governance mechanisms, will provide a better understanding of 
governance-performance relationship than looking at the impact of specific, individual 
mechanisms. Studies that have investigated the impact of governance indices on firm 
performance have focussed on developed and developing non-African countries and include 
Gompers et al (2003); Klapper and Love (2004); Drobetz et al (2004); Klein et al (2005); 
Chen et at (2007; Garay and González (2008); Bozec et al (2010) and Price et al (2011). For 
the first time, the analysis of the governance index-firm performance relationship is examined 
in Sub-Sahara Africa and the study of Ghana will help to address this gap in the literature. 
Third, there are no prior African studies or developing countries’ studies that have analysed 
the pre and the post governance-performance relationship given the introduction of a 
governance code. In contrast a number of studies have analysed the impact of the 
introduction of a governance code on developed economies such as the UK (Weir and Laing, 
  
2000), Australia (Cui et al, 2008) and the US (Bhagat and Bolton, 2009) and found that better 
governance resulted in better performance. 
Ghana is one of the developing countries characterised by economic uncertainties, 
weak legal controls, poor investor protection, illiquid stock market and recurrent government 
intervention (Robelo and Vasconcelos, 2002). Recently, Fisher (2011) of Forbes magazine 
ranked Ghana ninth on their list of the world’s worst-managed economies, and thus the 
possible negative impact on firm performance can be addressed. This is of particular 
importance because, in such an environment, a code of corporate governance becomes an 
important mechanism in protecting investors from expropriation by mangers (Klapper and 
Love, 2004). This is useful to regulators and policy makers because, if firms voluntarily 
adopt the recommendations of a code of corporate governance in a volatile economy like 
Ghana, investors’ interests are more likely to be protected and overseas investment will 
increase. Therefore, Ghana may be regarded as a testing ground for investigating the extent to 
which corporate governance is a credible mechanism that can protect investors in a country 
that has weak legal controls and poor economic management.                
We find a statistically significant increase in the degree of compliance with the 
Ghanaian Code provisions from the pre-2003 period to the post-2003 period. We also find 
that the corporate governance index has a statistically significant and positive impact on firm 
performance after controlling for endogeneity. Therefore, for Ghanaian firms, an 
improvement in their degree of compliance with the Ghanaian code provisions can provide a 
means of achieving improved performance. We also find that sub-indices dealing with audit 
committee, remuneration committee, shareholder interests and disclosure requirements have 
significant and positive effects on performance whereas sub-indices relating to board 
structure and financial affairs and auditing are insignificant.   
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 places the governance-
performance discussion within the agency model. Section 3 outlines the corporate governance 
system in Ghana. Section 4 reviews the literature on the governance index-performance 
relationship and sets out the hypotheses. Section 5 describes the sample, variables and 
outlines the research methodology. Section 6 analyses the results, with the concluding 
remarks and brief discussion of policy implications presented in section 7. 
 
 
 
2. Agency theory 
There are a number of theoretical approaches to analysing corporate governance issues. 
These include agency theory, resource dependency theory and stewardship theory. Agency 
theory deals with the conflicts of interest between owners and managers associated with 
separation of ownership and control in public quoted companies. Resource dependency 
theory suggests that organisations are dependent on external resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978), for example board members may also be members of other boards. Unlike the agency 
model in which managers’ act in their own best interests, stewardship theory argues that 
shareholder interests are pursued by managers and that there is no inherent, general problem 
of executive motivation. This paper takes the agency model as its starting point and it 
therefore offers indirect tests of the stewardship and resource dependency models. If we find 
that the governance changes improve performance, this will offer support for the agency 
model. In contrast, an insignificant result would offer some support for the stewardship 
theory because the governance changes should have no effect on performance. Resource 
dependency theory argues that the board is a resource to the firm and regards outside 
directors as particularly important (Hillman et al, 2000). The agency model allows for a 
wider range of mechanisms to be considered when assessing the impact of governance codes. 
  
The principal agent model identifies conflicting interests between the managers and 
owners (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Managers favour the pursuit of discretionary policies 
designed to enhance their standing or status whereas shareholders wish to maximise returns. 
Information asymmetry enables managers to pursue their own interests whilst the principals 
are assuming that theirs are being pursued. Information asymmetry will persist in firms that 
have dispersed ownership because there is no effective means of influencing the board. The 
lack of monitoring and accountability is therefore central to the agency problem, something 
which corporate governance codes try to address. However, it is important to be aware of the 
fact that there are a number of potential issues with the agency model including the 
effectiveness of some of the board-related mechanisms. For example, duality may be 
appropriate in certain circumstances and outside directors may not be independent.  
 
 
 
3. The Ghanaian corporate governance environment   
Ghana’s corporate governance regime is based on the 1963 Ghanaian Companies 
Code which was enacted to govern the formation and operation of Ghanaian firms. Its 
provisions are largely based on the English Common Law and are similar to the UK 
Companies Act 1948. Consistent with these provisions, the Securities Industry Law 1993 
(PNDCL 333) created the Securities and Exchange Commission Ghana (SECG) to supervise 
the operation of stock exchanges and firms in Ghana. In addition, the Ghana Stock Exchange 
(GSE) Listing Rules have played a significant role in the regulation of firms and in the 
development of corporate governance in Ghana. 
However, the corporate governance requirements enshrined in the SECG regulations 
and the GSE listing rules were limited only to audit committees and were therefore much 
narrower than the requirements of other countries (Owusu and Weir, 2013). The SECG 
mandates all public companies to make available to the Commission written evidence 
covering the operation and effectiveness of audit committees every year. However, this did 
not mention the composition of the committee. The GSE listing rules on the other hand did 
not specifically mention the audit committee but the guidelines and the steps for listing on the 
GSE state that written evidence of the existence, operation and effectiveness of such 
committee must be submitted as one of the listing requirements (GSE Listing Regulation 
1990, LI 1509). Although the GSE Listing Regulation (1990) recommends the membership 
should consist of non-executive directors, it failed to provide information about either the 
number or qualifications of these directors. This suggests that governance practices in Ghana 
were much weaker relative to international best practice prior to the introduction of the 
Ghanaian Code.       
The Ghanaian Governance Code introduced in 2003 was the first attempt to introduce 
official corporate governance guidelines not backed by the force of law. Consistent with the 
approach of many countries, including the UK and South Africa, the Ghanaian Code 
embodies a ‘comply or explain’ philosophy whereby firms are required to explain why they 
have not adopted the specific elements of the code in their annual report and it is down to the 
shareholders to accept or reject the explanation. This is of particularly important because the 
annual report should contain a statement by the board on how they have complied with the 
corporate governance provisions in the code. Unlike the SECG regulations and the GSE 
listing rules which focused more on the establishment of an audit committee, the code has 33 
provisions covering the six broad governance areas: board composition; audit committee; 
remuneration committee; shareholder rights; financial affairs and auditing and disclosure 
practices. The Code is also more detailed in its requirements relating to audit committees for 
example, it recommends for at least three directors the majority of whom should be non-
  
executive directors and they must have adequate financial knowledge before they can become 
a member of an audit committee. Appendix 1 presents the 33 provisions required by the code 
as well as the disclosure requirements of the SECG and GSE.  As shown in the Appendix, the 
GSE requirements only covered 7 of the Code’s requirements and the SEGG only 3. The 
Code therefore represented a significant widening of corporate governance in Ghana. 
The six broad governance areas identified in Ghana’s Code are also consistent with 
the OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD, 2004), which have become a model 
for the governance codes of developing economies (McGee, 2010). The OECD principles 
also cover six broad areas: ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance 
framework; the rights of shareholders and key ownership functions; the equitable treatment of 
shareholders; the role of stakeholders in corporate governance; disclosure and transparency; 
and the responsibilities of the board.  The Ghanaian code is also consistent with UK’s 
governance framework, recently updated by the Financial Reporting Council (2014), which 
covers how the board is led, its effectiveness, its accountability, how remuneration is set and 
its relations with shareholders. 
 
  
 
4. Literature review and hypotheses development 
 
4.1 Governance index and performance 
The relationship between individual governance mechanisms such as non-executive 
director representation and the lack of duality and company performance has been the subject 
of many studies. This literature covers both developed and developing economies: for 
example, Weir et al (2002) and Mura (2007) for the UK; Bozec (2005) for Canada; Chen et 
al (2008) and Field et al (2013) for the US; and Ghosh (2006), Isshaq et al (2009) and 
Mangena et al (2012) for developing economies. However, the results are mixed. This lack of 
consistent support for individual governance mechanisms has prompted interest in the 
relationship between a broader set of governance mechanisms, a governance index, and 
performance. Core (2001) and Brown and Caylor (2006) argue that incorporating specific 
governance mechanisms into a governance index that covers a range of mechanisms will 
have better explanatory power than that of individual governance mechanisms when 
explaining firm performance.  
Black (2001) was one of the first researchers to investigate corporate governance 
index and firm performance for a sample of 21 firms in Russia. He found that the correlation 
between the index and firm performance is positive and statistically strong, suggesting that 
corporate governance behaviour has a powerful effect on firm performance in Russia where 
legal and cultural constraints are poor. Similar studies that have focused on developing 
countries such as Venezuelan, and in particular South African listed firms, have found a 
positive association between their governance indices and performance (Garay and Gonzarez, 
2008; Ntim, 2013). More generally, similar conclusions are drawn by Klapper and Love 
(2004) in their analysis of the governance index-performance relationship in emerging 
markets. 
A number of studies in developed countries (Gompers et al, 2003; Drobetz et al, 
2004, Beiner et al, 2006; Cheung et al, 2007; Arcot and Bruno, 2007; Chen et al, 2007; 
Henry, 2008; Bebchuk et al, 2009; Renders et al, 2010; Bauer et al, 2010) have mostly found 
consistent results with those of Black (2001). For example, Renders et al (2010) conducted a 
  
cross-European study among 14 European countries
1
 regarding the relationship between 
corporate governance index and firm performance and found evidence of a highly significant 
and positive relationship between the two after controlling for sample selection bias and 
endogeneity. Without controlling for these econometric problems, the relationship is 
insignificant or negative in some cases. In respect of the individual European countries, the 
evidence suggests that firms in countries such as the UK with strong shareholder rights or 
extensive corporate governance recommendations have better corporate governance ratings 
but the impact on firm performance is smaller compared to the countries with weak 
shareholder rights. Given the potential problems of endogeneity in the study of governance-
performance relationship (Black, 2001), this evidence may have serious implications for 
majority of prior studies that have not addressed these econometric problems and may cast 
doubt on their results.     
However, there is also evidence in developed economies that the relationship between 
governance indices and firm performance is insignificant, for example, Klein et al, (2005), 
Gupta et al (2009) and Bozec et al (2010) for Canada. Further, a number of studies have 
found no relationship in developing countries. For example, using a single year’s data in a 
developing country, Cheung et al (2008) also reported an insignificant relationship between 
their governance index developed from the OECD principles of corporate governance 
introduced in 2004 and firm performance across Chinese listed firms. However, Cheung et al 
(2010) extended the study period across Chinese listed firms from 2004 to 2006 and found 
evidence of a statistically significant and positive relationship between their governance 
index and firm performance. This suggests that the effect of corporate governance on firm 
performance might take longer than one year period before any relationship can be 
established. In addition, Price et al (2011) have also found further evidence in Mexico, from 
2000 to 2004 to suggest no association between governance index and firm performance. 
They noted that monitoring mechanisms alone may not be enough to cause fundamental 
change in the economic behaviour of Mexican listed firms. 
Given the mixed evidence about the governance index-performance relationship in 
developing economies in particular, we address issues such as endogeneity and the use of 
panel rather than cross sectional data in this study. Following the introduction of a 
governance Code in an emerging market economy which exhibits a lack of investor 
protection and one that is dominated by concentrated ownership (Tsamenyi et al, 2007), 
Ghana offers a rich environment to investigate the impact of improved governance-related 
disclosures on firm performance. If a Ghanaian firm can commit to improved governance, 
then it is more likely that the firm will invest properly leading to fair returns to its investors. 
In addition, the analysis, unlike for example, Cheung et al (2008), uses Ghana’s own specific 
governance code and therefore we hypothesise that: 
 
H1:  There will be a positive relationship between governance index scores and firm 
performance 
 
 
 
4.2 Governance sub-indices and performance 
As discussed earlier, the Ghanaian code consists of six sub-sections, each of which 
deals with a different governance mechanism. It is therefore of interest to analyse the impact 
of these sub-sections on performance because it may be that some have a more important 
                                       
1
 These are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK 
  
influence on performance than others. A number of studies have found that sub-indices are 
important in developed economies. Klein et al (2005) find that not all of the sub-indices that 
constitute their total governance index affect firm performance equally. They report that the 
compensation, disclosure and shareholder rights sub-indices have a positive impact on the 
performance of Canadian firms but find no relationship between a board independence sub-
index and firm performance. Cheung et al (2007) also found that the disclosure and 
transparency sub-indices had a positive effect on the performance of Hong Kong companies. 
Cheung et al (2010) found that shareholder rights sub-indices have a positive effect on firm 
performance in China.  
Other studies have also shown the importance of analysing the relationship between 
performance and specific sub-indices in developing economies, for example, 
Balasubramanian et al (2010) for India and Price et al (2011) for Mexico. They find that a 
shareholder rights sub-index has a positive and significant impact on firm performance but 
find that other sub-indices are insignificant. Consistent with the empirical evidence, we 
hypothesise that:  
 
H2:  There will be a positive relationship between governance sub-indices and firm 
performance 
 
 
 
5. Sample, variables and methodology 
 
5.1 Data and sample 
Our sample consists of all listed firms quoted on the Ghana Stock Exchange over the period 
2000 to 2009, a period spanning the introduction of the 2003 Ghanaian Corporate 
Governance Code. This allows us to divide the sample into two sub-periods, pre 2003 (2000-
2002) and post 2003 (2004-2009). The names of listed companies were taken from the GSE 
website. Firms listed during each of the years under consideration were included in the 
sample based on the availability of their annual reports. Following Chen and Zang (2014), a 
longer post-code period (2004-2009) is used to control for the possible lagged effects of the 
introduction of the code. Table 1 contains the breakdown of the Ghanaian listed firms by 
industry and year excluding 2003, the year of the Code’s introduction. As of December 2009, 
there were 38 listed firms on the GSE but three of these firms did not have their annual 
reports available for all the study period. Our final sample of 35 represents 92% of all listed 
firms currently traded on the GSE which generates a database of 258 firm year observations.   
 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
In line with Gompers et al (2003) and Garay and Gonzalez (2008), we develop a 
Ghanaian Corporate Governance Index (GCGI) based on the criteria set out in the Ghanaian 
Corporate Governance Code. These criteria are used to construct an index which is then used 
as a proxy for firm-level governance quality. In relation to measuring the extent to which a 
company complied with the Ghanaian Code, the annual reports of each firm were read and 
each time a comment was included that showed compliance with a specific recommendation, 
it was given a value 1, and 0 if there was non-compliance. Unlike Mexico where regulators 
require each listed company to complete a Code of Best Practices questionnaire at the end of 
each financial year (Price et al, 2011), we relied on the corporate governance information 
disclosed in each firm’s annual reports to develop our index because firms are not required to 
  
produce separate corporate governance report in Ghana, an approach similar to Abraham et al 
(2015). The coding was initially done by one of the principal researchers and this was 
independently checked to ensure consistency and accuracy.  
The index, as set out in Table 2, consists of 33 elements identified in the code as 
representing good governance. A firm’s governance index in a particular financial year end 
can vary between 0 and 33, with 0 indicating complete non-compliance (0%) and 33 
indicating complete compliance (100%). The index consists of six sub-indices: (1) board 
composition; (2) audit committee; (3) remuneration committee; (4) shareholder rights; (5) 
financial affairs and auditing; and (6) disclosure practices. Each sub-index consists of six 
elements with the exception of the financial affairs and auditing sub-index which consists of 
three legally required elements and three ‘comply or explain’ elements. This sub-index is 
therefore scored out of three rather than six. We ran the complete analysis excluding the 
partial sub index and the results were qualitatively the same. The partial sub index result is 
included for completeness.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Table 3 contains the variable definitions used in the analysis with all firm 
performance and control variables data taken from the 2005 and 2010 GSE Factbooks which 
contain the relevant financial statements and ownership data of the sample firms. The 
measures of firm performance we use are return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and 
Tobin’s Q (Q). These accounting-based (ROA and ROE) and market-based (Q) firm 
performance measures used are very important because insiders (management) and outsiders 
(investors) measure firm performance differently (Black et al, 2006). ROA and ROE are 
commonly used short-term measures of operating performance, whereas Q represents the 
widely used long-term proxy for firm valuation (Sami et al, 2011).    
Consistent with prior studies (Gompers et al, 2003; Klapper and Love, 2004; Garay 
and Gonzalez, 2008; Bozec et al, 2010), we include several control variables. These are: 
gearing (GEAR), growth opportunities (GROWTH), firm size (SIZE), block shareholdings 
(BLOCKHOLD), board ownership (BOARDOWN) and firm age (AGE). Given that firms that 
are not actively followed by analysts or brokers and audited by one of the Big 4 auditors try 
to artificially improve their performance by manipulating their accounting numbers and 
abnormal accruals (Yu, 2008), we control for the accounting regime which is the adoption of 
the International Financial Reporting Standards (AIFRS), and earnings smoothing measures 
such as discretionary accruals (DAs) and audit quality (AUDITOR). We also include firm 
specific dummy and year dummy variables. 
  
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
 
5.2 Research methodology 
We employ a panel data regression analysis which provides a means of controlling for 
unobserved firm heterogeneity. This allows us to analyse the impact of corporate governance 
that varies over time on firm performance. We use the Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange 
Multiplier test to choose between pooled OLS and the alternative random or fixed effects 
models; and the Hausman (1978) specification test to differentiate between random and fixed 
effects regression models. 
The Hausman specification test allows us to decide which model is appropriate by 
testing for correlation between the independent variables and the individual firm-specific 
effects. If there is no correlation, a random-effects model should be used but if correlation is 
  
present, fixed-effects is more appropriate. Using ROA, ROE and Q as the firm performance 
measures in equations 1, 2 and 3, the Hausman test gave X
2
 of 45.01, 82.22 and 68.44 (p-
value = 0.000, 0.000 and 0.012), respectively. This suggests that the hypothesis of no 
correlation between the independent variables and the individual firm-specific effects is 
rejected and therefore fixed effects regression is appropriated as a method of estimation. The 
fixed effects regression model initially used to investigate the relationship between the GCGI 
and performance across the Ghanaian firms has the following general forms:    
 
 
 
 
 
 
where ROAit, ROEit and Qit are the dependent variables;  is the overall intercept; 
 is a set of governance provisions represented by the GCGI, j, for firm i in 
year t;   is a set of firm specific control variables, k, for firm i in year t; where k = 
1 to m;  is a vector of 9 dummy variables representing the 10 sample years;  is the firm 
specific fixed effects, consisting of a vector of 34 dummy variables to represent the 35 
sample firms; and  is the unobserved error component. We also perform regressions on 
equations (1), (2) and (3) using each of the sub-indices of the GCGI as explanatory variables. 
 
 
 
6. Analysis and results 
 
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
The results in Table 4 show that the firm-level governance quality based on the Ghanaian 
Code criteria has improved over time. The GCGI increased from an average of 52% 
compliance in 2000 to 74% compliance in 2008. This increase in compliance with the 
Ghanaian Code is in line with other studies such as Weir and Laing (2000), Price et al (2011), 
Ntim et al (2012) and Abraham et al (2015) that reported a significant increase in compliance 
with corporate governance practices among UK, Mexican, South African and Indian listed 
firms, respectively. On average the GCGI recorded a 68% compliance with the Ghanaian 
Code during the ten year period. Whereas Ntim et al (2012) found a mean compliance of 
61% across South African firms, Aggarwal et al (2007) in their cross-country study reported 
mean compliance of 69%, 61%, 57% and 56% for Canadian, US, Finland and the UK firms, 
respectively. These findings suggest that the Ghanaian listed firms’ degree of compliance 
with corporate governance provisions not only increased over the period but is above average 
compared with the compliance levels in the other parts of the world. This is consistent with 
Owusu and Weir (2013) who find that the directors of the Ghanaian listed firms regard the 
Ghanaian Code as a benchmark for good corporate governance. 
  
 Table 4 also shows that most of the six sub-indices experienced substantial increases 
since 2000. The exception was BOARDINDEX which saw a reduction of 2 percentage 
points, from 66% in 2000 to 64% in 2009. A possible reason for this is that one of the 
components of the board composition sub-index, board size, experienced a significant 
reduction in compliance over the period. The compliance figure fell from 71% in 2000 to 
51% in 2009 and may therefore explain the overall small fall in the board composition index.  
The audit committee sub-index experienced the highest increase over the ten-year 
period with a 53 percentage point increase in the degree of compliance. This suggests that 
firms had not taken the audit issues seriously prior to the introduction of the Code.  The 
remuneration committee index recorded a 10 percentage point increase and remained the sub-
index with the lowest level of compliance in 2009. Increases in compliance were also found 
for the shareholder (12 percentage points), financial affairs and auditing (26 percentage 
points) and disclosure (23 percentage points) sub-indices. The overall trend is that there is a 
greater degree of compliance in the various sub-indices which indicates that the Ghanaian 
firms had been adopting the Ghanaian corporate governance code.  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
Gurgler et al (2003) argued that developing economies such as Ghana will exhibit 
weak corporate governance mechanisms. We investigate this in Table 5. In relation to the 
pre-Code period, column 1 shows that there was an average (median) of 56% (50%) 
compliance with the features that are regarded as good governance. In terms of the sub-
indices, we find that for four of the six categories the compliance rates were between 65% 
(65%) and 75% (67%). However, the categories relating to audit committees and 
remuneration committees showed compliance rates of only 26% (0%) and 29% (17%) 
respectively. These results are important because they illustrate that two of the key 
monitoring mechanisms were missing from the majority of firms quoted on the GSE prior to 
the introduction of the code. They also suggest that in spite of the strong legal and 
institutional frameworks within which quoted firms operated, many key governance 
mechanisms were not present suggesting that there were areas of weak governance prior to 
the introduction of the code. 
Table 5 also compares the mean (median) compliance figures for the overall 
governance index, and for each of the individual sub-indices of the GCGI, for periods 
covering before and after the introduction of the Ghanaian corporate governance code. As 
Table 5 Panel A shows, there was a significant increase in the GCGI in the post-code period 
from 56% (50%) to 73% (72%). Other studies, for example, Cui et al (2008) also reported 
increases in governance scores post the introduction of a governance code in Australia.  
Panel B of Table 5 reports the changes in the sub-indices. Although there has been a 
fall in the average (median) compliance of BOARDINDEX, it is insignificant. There have 
been significant increases in the extent of compliance in each of the other five sub-indices. 
The biggest improvement is found in the audit committee index where a 189% increase 
occurred. This would appear to bring into line with the current trends in the adoption of audit 
committee requirements worldwide.  
Compliance remains lowest for the REMCOMINDEX with, on average (median) 
36% (18%) of firms complying in the post-code period however, the improvement was 
statistically significant. With the exception of reporting the highest aggregate compensation 
paid to directors, all other elements of the sub-index exhibited poor compliance levels. For 
example, by 2009, only 6% of firms included company stock as part of executive 
remuneration and only 22% had a non-executive director as chairman of the remuneration 
committee. 
  
The shareholder rights index also recorded a significant increase in compliance over 
the two sub-periods. The average (median) figure would have been higher but for the 
continued very low levels of compliance with one of the recommendations with only 3% of 
firms giving shareholders the opportunity to vote by mail by 2009. 
The FAAINDEX also saw a significant increase post-code with the increase being 
driven by the compliance with the requirement to monitor risk, the average (median) rising 
from 75% (66%) to 95% (100%). The DISCINDEX also increased significantly in the post-
code period.  
 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics for the firm performance and control 
variables. The average return on assets is 5.69%, the return on equity is 18.67% and Tobin’s 
Q averages 2.13. Average gearing is 26.95% and sales growth was, on average, 9%. The 
average log of assets as a measure of firm size is 6.49 and the average age of the firms was 32 
years. We find that boards held an average of 8.59% of a firm’s equity and the average total 
block shareholdings was 52.96%. Also, the average discretionary accruals is 0.08, change in 
accounting regime in the form of the adoption of the IFRS averages 29% and on average, 
76% of the Ghanaian listed firms have one of the Big 4 auditors as external auditor.   
 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
 
 
6.2 Results on the governance index-performance relationship 
Table 7 presents Pearson’s correlation coefficients for the firm performance, corporate 
governance and control variables. There are large positive correlation coefficients between 
the GCGI and its sub-indices (i.e. BOARDINDEX, AUCOMINDEX, RECOMINDEX, 
SHOLDINDEX, FAAINDEX and DISCINDEX). Also, high collinearity exists between 
AUCOMINDEX and FAAINDEX & DISCINDEX. Due to the problem of multicollinearity, 
these variables were included in separate regression models in our empirical analysis. 
 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
 
Table 8 presents the fixed effects regression model results. Models 1, 2 and 3 report 
the relationship between the GCGI and all the performance measures (ROA, ROE and Q) and 
the results is insignificant. These initial results therefore suggest that there is no relationship 
between governance and performance.  
However, the relationship between governance and performance may be endogenous 
(Black, 2001). For example, better performing firms may have better governance structures; 
however, poorer performing firms may be in the process of improving their governance 
mechanism with the objective of improving performance (Beiner et al, 2006). Therefore the 
relationship between governance and performance might run from performance to 
governance rather than from governance to performance (Bozec et al, 2010). Given the panel 
nature of our data, we use the Wooldridge (2006) formal endogeneity test to ascertain 
whether or not our main explanatory variable, the GCGI, is endogenous. The test involves 
estimating the fixed effects regression model augmented by the inclusion of leading and 
lagged values of the potentially endogenous variable (GCGI). If the coefficient of either the 
leading or lagged variable is statistically significant, then GCGI is endogenous. We find that 
the lagged GCGI to be statistically significant and positively related to the firm performance 
measures of ROA, ROE and Q indicating that the GCGI is endogenous.   
  
One way to address the endogeneity problem is to use instrumental variables (Bozec 
et al, 2010; Larcker and Rusticus 2010). Instrumental variables involve choosing a proxy 
variable which is correlated with GCGI, but is also uncorrelated with the error term. A two-
stage instrumental variable fixed effects regression methodology is used to address the 
endogeneity of GCGI. In the first stage, consistent with Henry (2008), a dummy variable was 
employed as an instrument called the Ghanaian Code Change (GCC), indicating the 
introduction of the 2003 Ghanaian Code. The dummy has a value of 1 for all companies and 
all years from 2004 onwards and 0 for all companies and all years up to, and including, 2003. 
It therefore differentiates between the pre and post code periods. The appropriateness of this 
dummy variable as an instrument is based on the expectation that the adoption of the 
Ghanaian Code provisions introduced in 2003 will impact on firm performance post-2003.   
As models 4, 5 and 6 of Table 8 show, after addressing the endogeneity problem, 
there is a statistically significant and positive relationship between GCGI and all three 
performance measures.   
 
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
 
The analysis is developed in Panels A and B of Table 9 which report the results for 
the instrumental variables fixed effects regressions for the impact of each of the sub-indices 
on firm performance (i.e. ROA and Q). To save space we report only the results for the sub-
indices and exclude the control variables. We find a statistically significant and positive 
relationship between performance and a number of sub-indices: AUCOMINDEX, 
RECOMINDEX, SHOLDINDEX and DISCINDEX but insignificant results for 
BOARDINDEX and FAAINDEX. These findings are consistent with Klein et al (2005) and 
support the view that certain elements of corporate governance appear to have a stronger 
effect on performance than others. They also show the importance of looking beyond board 
composition with its emphasis on non-executive director representation and the separation of 
the roles of CEO and chairman. Although not reported, we find similar results for ROE 
except for RECOMINDEX sub-index where the relationship between the two is insignificant. 
 
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE 
 
6.3 Robustness test  
In our fixed effects regression analysis, one main concern is whether sectoral differences 
affect performance. In order to check the robustness of our results, we perform an additional 
test using industry dummies to control for sectoral effects (Gompers et al, 2003). This 
analysis will also help us to distinguish between the period (year) or cross-section (firm) 
specifications. Given that the Ghanaian listed firms are categorised into seven key industrial 
sectors, we replicated equations 1, 2 and 3 and included 6 dummy variables representing the 
7 industries to control for sectoral effect and excluded the time effect (i.e. year dummy). Even 
after accounting for industry differences, we find a positive and significant relationship 
between the governance index and performance. Overall, the findings from these robustness 
tests are similar to the earlier results reported.  
    
 
 
7. Conclusions 
Based on agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), we expect firms with good governance 
to perform better than firms with poor governance. Prompted by the introduction of the 
Ghanaian Code in 2003, this paper investigates the impact of corporate governance changes 
  
on the performance of the Ghanaian listed firms over the period from 2000 to 2009. This was 
evaluated by constructing a corporate governance index to measure the governance-
performance relationship over the whole period as well as analysing the impact of the 
introduction of the code on compliance and performance.  
The results show a statistically significant increase in the degree of compliance with 
the Ghanaian Code provisions from the pre-code period to the post-code period. This 
suggests that stronger governance mechanisms were in place after the code was introduced. 
As hypothesised, after controlling for endogeneity, we find that a greater degree of 
compliance with the Ghanaian Code is positively and significantly associated with better firm 
performance. In the absence of controlling for endogeneity, the results show an insignificant 
relationship. We also find that the sub-elements within the overall index dealing with audit, 
remuneration, shareholder and disclosure issues have a significant and positive effect on 
performance whereas board structure and financial affairs and auditing sub-indices are not. 
However, we must be cautious about how we interpret the financial affairs sub-index because 
it has only three elements whereas the others each have six. Nevertheless, the results suggest 
that, in Ghana, better governed firms, on average, perform better than less well governed 
firms. 
Although a developing economy, the governance changes that have been introduced 
in Ghana have been shown to be effective in improving firm performance. Given the 
increasing globalisation of the world economy, this sends an important signal to overseas 
investors that Ghana has an effective governance framework, something which should make 
it a more attractive investment destination. These results support Bokpin (2011) who argues 
that Ghana, although a developing economy, has a strong corporate governance regime 
because of its combination of laws and stock exchange regulations.  
One limitation of this study is the development of a corporate governance index. The 
binary coding used to construct the GCGI may not reflect the relative importance of the 
different corporate governance provisions. This means that all elements included in the index 
are given equal weighting. In this respect, future research may assign weights to each of the 
corporate governance provisions but this may have the disadvantage of making subjective 
judgements relative to the importance of each corporate governance provision recommended 
by the Ghanaian Code. 
The results of our paper provide evidence of the importance of addressing the 
econometric problems within the governance-performance relationship studies. Our study 
also contributes to the literature by providing evidence from a developing African country 
that higher compliance with a code of corporate governance leads to better firm performance 
after controlling for endogeneity. Our results are important for both policy makers and 
companies. For policy makers, it is encouraging for the development of a code of corporate 
governance to regulate the operational environment of firms rather than implementing rigid 
laws that may not be value relevant.  For the companies, the improvement in compliance with 
a code of corporate governance can provide a means of achieving improved performance. 
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Table 1: Breakdown of the Ghanaian listed firms by industry and year 
 
Panel A: Sample Distribution by Industry 
 
 
 
Industry 
 
Finance 
 
Distribution 
 
ICT 
 
Manufacturing 
 
Mining 
 
Food & 
Beverage 
 
Agriculture 
 
No. of 
firms 
 
11 
 
8 
 
2 
 
9 
 
2 
 
2 
 
1 
 
 
 
Panel B: Sample Distribution by Year Excluding 2003 
 
 
Financial 
Year 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
  Total   Firm-Years 
 
 
258 
 
No. of 
firms 
 
21 
 
21 
 
23 
 
29 
 
31 
            
31 
 
32 
 
35 
 
35 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2: Questions for construction of the Ghanaian Corporate Governance Index (GCGI) 
 
GCGI Dimensions                           Ghanaian Corporate Governance Index (GCGI) Questions 
 
 
 
 
BOARDINDEX 
1 Are the Chairman of the board and the Chief Executive Officer post separated? 
2 Does the company board meet at least six times a year?  
3 Is the board size between eight and sixteen members as recommended by the Ghanaian Code? 
4 Does the proportion of the independent non-executive directors (NEDs) represent at least one third 
but not less than two of the total members of the board? 
5 Does the company have a Finance Director charged with the responsibility for the finance function? 
6 Does the company have a Secretary charged with the responsibility for the effective function of the 
board? 
 
 
 
 
AUCOMINDEX 
1 Does the company have an audit committee in place? 
2 Is the audit committee of a company composed of a minimum of three directors of whom majority 
are independent NEDs? 
3 Do the company audit committee members comprise directors with adequate financial Knowledge? 
4 Is the chairman of the audit committee an independent NED? 
5 Does the company disclose in its annual report the membership of its audit committee for each 
financial year? 
6 Does the company report on the activities of its audit committee in the annual report to shareholders? 
 
 
 
RECOMINDEX 
1 Does the company have a remuneration committee in place? 
2 Is the remuneration committee of a company composed of a majority of independent NEDs?  
3 Is there any disclosure of the company’s remuneration committee membership in the annual report? 
4 Is the chairman of the remuneration committee an independent non-executive director? 
5 Does the company provide information in its annual report on the aggregate amount of compensation 
paid to its directors? 
6 Do directors receive part of their remuneration in stock or stock option and disclose in the annual 
report? 
 
 
SHOLDINDEX 
1 Does the company give adequate notice and information to its shareholders prior to its Annual 
General Meeting (AGM)? 
2 Does the company allow shareholders to approve its directors’ re-election at the AGM?  
3 Does the company facilitate voting by proxy to appoint directors at the AGM? 
4 Are there any opportunities given to the company’s shareholders to vote by mail? 
5 Does the company provide information in its annual report related party transactions to its 
shareholders? 
6 Does the company disclose its directors share ownership in its annual report to shareholders? 
 
FAAINDEX 
1 Does the company produce its annual report by the legally required date? 
2 Does the company provide information in its annual report the existence of appropriate systems to 
monitor risk and financial governance measures? 
3 Does the company disclose in its annual report the fees paid to its external auditors for audit and 
non-audit related work? 
 
 
 
 
DISCINDEX 
1 Does the company annual report include information on its current and future prospects together 
with foreseeable material risk factors? 
2 Does the company disclose in its annual report a statement of responsibility of the preparation of its 
financial statements? 
3 Does the company produce a statement as to the adequacy of internal control in its annual report? 
4 Does the company disclose in its annual report a statement as to the compliance with the law? 
5 Does the company disclose in its annual report a statement of compliance with corporate 
governance? 
6 Does the company produce information on the degree of being a going concern in its annual report 
for each financial year? 
Note: Each question has a yes or no answer based on the Ghanaian Code provisions. If the answer is yes, then the value of 1 is 
attributed to the question, otherwise the value is 0. The Ghanaian Corporate Governance Index is the sum of the points for 
each question. The maximum index value is 33 (100% compliance). Index dimensions are simply the sum of the points for 
each question. For example, the maximum value for Audit Committee Index (AUCOMINDEX) is 6 (100% compliance). All 
questions are answered using public information disclosed by the listed companies in their annual reports. 
 
 
  
Table 3: Variable measurements in the regression models 
CODE Name of Variable Variable Definition Source of Data 
ROA Return on Assets Calculated as operating profit after tax to total assets at year-
end. 
GSE 2005 and 
2010 Factbooks
 
ROE Return on Equity Calculated as operating profit after tax to book value of 
equity at year-end. 
GSE 2005 and 
2010 Factbooks 
 
Q 
 
Tobin’s Q 
Calculated as the market value to book value of total assets, 
where the market value of total assets is measured by the 
market value of equity plus the book value of total assets 
minus the book value of equity. 
GSE 2005 and 
2010 Factbooks 
GCGI Ghanaian Corporate 
Governance Index 
Corporate governance index based on binary objective 
questions, where each aspect of compliance with the 
Ghanaian Code provisions disclosed in the company’s 
annual reports is scored ‘1’, and scaled on a 0-33 range.  
2000 to 2009 
Annual Reports
 
BOARDINDEX Board Composition 
Index 
Sub-Index of the GCGI containing six questions relating to 
the board structure, scaled on a 0-6. 
2000 to 2009 
Annual Reports 
AUCOMINDEX Audit Committee 
Index 
Sub-Index of the GCGI containing six questions relating to 
the existence and structure of the audit committee, scaled on 
a 0-6. 
2000 to 2009 
Annual Reports 
RECOMINDEX Remuneration 
Committee Index 
Sub-Index of the GCGI containing six questions relating to 
the existence and structure of the remuneration committee, 
scaled on a 0-6. 
2000 to 2009 
Annual Reports 
SHOLDINDEX Shareholder Rights 
Index 
Sub-Index of the GCGI containing six questions relating to 
shareholder rights provisions, scaled on a 0-6. 
2000 to 2009 
Annual Reports 
FAAINDEX Financial Affairs & 
Auditing Index 
Sub-Index of the GCGI containing six questions relating to 
financial affairs and auditing provisions, scaled on a 0-3. 
2000 to 2009 
Annual Reports 
DISCINDEX Disclosure Index Sub-Index of the GCGI containing six questions relating to 
disclosure provisions, scaled on a 0-6. 
2000 to 2009 
Annual Reports 
GEAR Gearing  Calculated as the total debt to capital employed, where 
capital employed is the sum of total debt and equity.   
GSE 2005 and 
2010 Factbooks 
SIZE Firm Size Natural logarithm of book value of total assets in millions of 
Ghana Cedis at year-end. 
GSE 2005 and 
2010 Factbooks 
GROWTH Growth Opportunities Calculated as the percentage difference between the current 
year’s sales and previous year’s sales divided by the 
previous year’s sales. 
GSE 2005 and 
2010 Factbooks 
AGE Firm Age Calculated as the number of years since a particular firm’s 
incorporation to the 2009 year-end. 
GSE 2005 and 
2010 Factbooks 
BOARDOWN Board Ownership Calculated as the proportion of shares held by board of 
directors to the total shareholdings. 
2000 to 2009 
Annual Reports 
BLOCKHOLD Block Shareholdings Calculated as the proportion of shares held by shareholders 
in excess of 3% of the total shareholdings. 
2000 to 2009 
Annual Reports 
DAs Discretionary 
Accruals 
Discretionary accruals estimated using Modified Jones 
Model (Dechow et al., 1995) DAsj,t = (TACj,t/TAj,t) − NA 
GSE 2005 and 
2010 Factbooks 
AIFRS Adoption of IFRS = 1 if the firm has adopted International Financial Reporting 
Standards, and 0 if otherwise. 
2000 to 2009 
Annual Reports 
AUDITOR BIG4 Auditor = Estimated as 1 if the firm is audited by one of the 
international reputable audit firms, and 0 if otherwise.  
2000 to 2009 
Annual Reports 
Note: The Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) 2005 and 2010 Factbooks are the official documents that are used to consolidate 
all the financial data for every 5 years (2000 to 2004; and 2005 to 2009) for all listed companies in Ghana and are available 
from the GSE Library. The corporate governance and ownership data were collected from 283 annual reports. The annual 
reports were either hand collected from the companies and in some cases from the GSE Library.    
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 4: The degree of compliance with the Ghanaian Code overtime 
GCGI is the Ghanaian corporate governance index, BOARDINDEX is the board composition index, 
AUCOMINDEX is the audit committee index, RECOMINDEX is the remuneration committee index, 
SHOLDINDEX is the shareholder rights index, FAAINDEX is the financial affairs and auditing index and 
DISCINDEX is the disclosure index.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A:Descriptive statistics of the overall index 
GCGI All 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Mean 68 52 54 61 61 70 70 74 74 74 72 
Minimum 39 42 42 42 39 44 44 50 50 50 42 
Maximum 100 89 89 89 89 97 97 100 100 100 100 
 
Panel B:Descriptive statistics of the sub-indices 
BOARDINDEX 
Mean 64 66 66 65 63 65 65 63 64 64 64 
Minimum 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Maximum 100 83 83 83 83 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Observations 283 21 21 23 25 29 31 31 32 35 35 
AUCOMINDEX 
Mean 61 18 21 38 39 72 75 81 81 72 71 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
RECOMINDEX 
Mean 34 27 28 33 29 35 34 36 38 36 37 
Minimum 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Maximum 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Observations 283 21 21 23 25 29 31 31 32 35 35 
SHOLDINDEX 
Mean 74 67 67 73 73 74 73 75 75 79 79 
Minimum 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 67 50 
Maximum 100 83 83 83 83 83 83 100 100 100 100 
FAAINDEX 
Mean 82 64 66 72 75 84 85 88 88 90 90 
Minimum 50 67 67 67 50 67 67 83 83 83 83 
Maximum 100 95 100 100 96 100 100 97 97 100 100 
DISCINDEX 
Mean 88 71 72 79 81 90 90 95 96 94 94 
Minimum 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 67 50 50 
Maximum 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Observations 283 21 21 23 25 29 31 31 32 35 35 
  
Table 5: Differences in the GCGI across Ghanaian listed firms 
The t-test and test statistics in columns 4 and 5 are the independent-samples t-test (mean) and Mann 
Whitney U test (median) based on pre-2003 and post-2003 GCGI and its sub-indices. The sub-indices 
include BOARDINDEX, AUCOMINDEX, RECOMINDEX, SHOLDINDEX, FAAINDEX and 
DISCINDEX. The mean (median) differences in panel A test for equality of means (median) between pre-
2003 and post-2003 of the overall GCGI, while the mean (median) differences in Panel B test for equality 
of means (median) between pre-2003 and post-2003 sub-indices. A mean (median) difference with (***) 
indicates that the null hypothesis that the means (median) are equal is rejected at 1% significant level. 
 Pre-2003 
(2000-2002) 
Mean (Median) % 
Post-2003 
(2004-2009) 
Mean (Median) % 
 
 
t-test 
 
Mann-Witney U 
Test  
Panel A: Overall index 
 
GCGI 
 
 
Panel B: Sub-indices 
BOARDINDEX 
AUCOMINDEX 
RECOMINDEX 
SHOLDINDEX 
FAAINDEX 
DISCINDEX 
 
56 (50) 
 
 
65 (67) 
26 (0) 
29 (17) 
69 (67) 
75 (66) 
74 (65) 
 
73 (72) 
 
 
64 (66) 
75 (83) 
36 (18) 
76 (84) 
95 (100) 
93 (100) 
 
-7.041
*** 
 
 
0.563 
-7.933
*** 
-1.511
*** 
-4.167
*** 
-10.512
*** 
-8.851
*** 
 
(-6.595
***
) 
 
 
(0.497) 
(-7.286
***
) 
(-1.872
**
) 
(-3.994
***
) 
(-10.816
***
) 
(-8.206
***
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 6: Descriptive statistics of firm performance and control variables 
ROA is the return on assets, ROE is the return on equity and Q is the Tobin’s Q. GEAR is gearing, SIZE is 
the firm size, GROWTH is the growth opportunity, AGE is the firm age, BOARDOWN is the board 
ownership, BLOCKHOLD is the block shareholdings, DAs is the discretionary accruals, AIFRS is the 
adoption of International Reporting Standards and AUDITOR is the Big 4 auditor. 
 Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
ROA% 5.699 11.322 -29.737 70.669 
ROE % 18.667 39.769 -40.061 53.611 
Q 2.128 1.674 -2.59 15.121 
GEAR %  26.951 26.089 0.00 70.326 
SIZE 6.498 1.325 3.886 9.284 
GROWTH 0.091 0.517 -0.999 3.303 
AGE 32.781 13.989 1.000 65.00 
BOARDOWN%  8.589 18.549 0.00 86.82 
BLOCKOWN%  52.96 13.815 27.27 95.14 
DAs 0.076 0.413 0.84 1.38 
AIFRS% 29.00 45.60 0.00 1.00 
AUDITOR% 76.00 42.80 0.00 1.00 
 
  
                                                            Table 7: Pearson correlation matrix of the dependent and the explanatory variables 
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ROA 1 
                  
ROE .685
** 1                  
Q-ratio .177
** .184** 1                 
GCGI .001 .065 .032 1 
               
BOARD 
INDEX 
.047 .168* .157* .481* 1               
AUCOM 
INDEX 
038 .031 .018 .873** .194* 1              
RECOM 
INDEX 
.134 .094 .083 .679* .337* .700* 1             
SHOLD 
INDEX 
.118** .098* 037* .460* .286** .229** .164* 1            
FAA 
INDEX 
-.093 -.097 -.088 .643* .136* .589** .109 .397** 1           
DISC 
INDEX 
.122 0.54* .085** .810* .253* .732* .323** .385** .429* 1          
GEAR -.214
** -.216** .031 .177** .137** .150* .216** -.105 .135** 0.38 .1         
SIZE -.066 .027 -.112 .018 -.135
** .039 .093 -.024 .018 -.034 197** 1        
GROWTH .134
* .161** .058 -.064 .028 -.070 .027 -.006 -.158** -.128* -.039 .144** 1       
AGE .144
** .005 -.045 -.102 .072 -.214** -.008 .092 -.048 -.115 -.189* -.052 -.025 1      
BOARDOWN .230
** .222** .198** -.129 -.362** .037 -.161** -.245* .056 -.024 .002 .135* -.105 -.178* 1     
BLOCKHOLD .139
** .125** .277** .086 .111 .123** -.054 .187** .181** .170** .002 -.013 .115* .082 -.140* 1    
DAs .149
* .126** .112* -.140** -.067 -.167** -.004 .010 .066 .023 -.121 -.167** .064 .130** -.144** -.128* 1   
AIFRS -.109 .083 -.046 .211
** .019 .199** .038 ..229** .330** .172** .140* -.122 .031 -.004 .005 .047 .132** 1  
AUDITOR .182
** .092 .028 .038 .172** .196** -.052 .266* .175** .104* -.061 .102* .029 .150* .048 .445** -.179** .017 1 
Notes: The table indicates Pearson’s correlation coefficients. ** and * denote correlation is significant at the 1% and 5% level (two tailed). ROA is the return on assets, ROE 
is the return on equity, Q is the Tobin’s Q, GCGI is the Ghanaian corporate governance index,  BOARDINDEX is the board composition index, AUCOMINDEX is the audit 
committee index, RECOMINDEX is the remuneration committee index, SHOLDINDEX is the shareholder rights index, FAAINDEX is the financial affairs and auditing index, 
DISCINDEX is the disclosure index, GEAR is gearing, SIZE is the firm size, GROWTH is the growth opportunity,  AGE is the firm age, BOARDOWN is the board ownership, 
BLOCKHOLD is the block shareholdings, DAs.is the absolute discretionary accruals, AIFRS is the adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards and 
AUDITOR is the Big 4 auditor.   
  
Table 8: Fixed effects regression results for the impact of the GCGI on firm performance.  
Models 1, 2 and 3 do not correct for endogeneity. Models 4, 5 and 6 correct for endogeneity using the Ghanaian 
Code Change (GCC) as an instrumental variable measured as 1 if the observation is from the post-code period 
(2004-2009) and 0 otherwise. ROA is the return on assets, ROE is the return on equity and Q is the Tobin’s Q. GCGI 
is the Ghanaian corporate governance index, GEAR is gearing, SIZE is the firm size, GROWTH is the growth 
opportunity, AGE is the firm age, BOARDOWN is the board ownership, BLOCKHOLD is the block shareholdings, 
DAs is the discretionary accruals, AIFRS is the adoption of International Reporting Standards and AUDITOR is the 
Big 4 auditor. The models provide t-statistics which are in parenthesis. Coefficients are on top of parenthesis. Year 
dummy and firm dummy variables are included in the regression models but their coefficients are not reported. ***, 
** and * significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. 
      Model 1          Model 2       Model 3       Model 4       Model 5        Model 6 
          ROA             ROE        Q      ROA     ROE    Q 
GCGI 0.120 0.310 0.113 0.225 0.359 0.317 
 (1.21) (1.00) (0.88) (2.09)** (2.61)*** (3.21)*** 
GEAR -0.063 -0.517 0.009 -0.052 -0.417 0.007 
 (1.84) (4.62)*** (1.68)* (1.70)* (4.06)*** (1.72)* 
SIZE -0.698 0.110 -0.010 -0.506 4.139 -0.065 
 (0.92) (1.67)* (0.09) (0.76) (1.83)* (0.61) 
GROWTH 0.958 8.454 0.461 1.867 10.122 0.383 
 (0.64) (1.74)* (1.97)** (1.27) (2.06)** (1.73)* 
AGE 0.214 0.730 -0.178 0.048 0.439 -0.010 
 (0.49) (0.59) (0.25) (0.62) (1.64) (0.72) 
BOARDOWN 0.018 0.234 0.027 0.186 0.679 0.021 
 (0.07) (0.26) (0.62) (3.16)*** (3.38)*** (1.96)** 
BLOCKHOLD 0.243 0.684 0.050 0.083 0.456 0.036 
 (1.65) (3.51)*** (2.17)** (1.23) (1.98)** (2.98)*** 
DAs 0.217 0.414 0.551 0.498 0.085 0.428 
 (1.72)* (1.87)* (3.34)*** (1.84)* (1.76)* (2.78)*** 
AIFRS -0.405 0.503 -0.556 -0.797 0.345 -0.211 
 (1.25) (3.38)*** (1.00) (1.74)* (4.22)** (0.41) 
AUDITOR 0.325 0.504 0.570 0.516 0.025 0.306 
 (0.35) (1.05) (0.96) (1.05) (0.37) (0.76) 
_cons -19.597 -16.355 14.970 19.504 -17.998 -12.852 
 (2.65)*** (1.96)** (2.19)** (2.70)*** (1.85)* (1.97)** 
R
2
 0.16 0.29 0.15 0.22 0.34 0.26 
N 244 244 244 244 244 244 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 9: Instrumental variables fixed effects regression results for the impact of the sub-indices on ROA & Q 
All the models correct for endogeneity using the Ghanaian Code Change (GCC) as an instrumental variable 
measured as 1 if the observation is from the post-code period (2004-2009) and 0 otherwise. ROA is the return on 
assets and Q is the Tobin’s Q. BOARDINDEX is the board composition index, AUCOMINDEX is the audit 
committee index, RECOMINDEX is the remuneration committee index, SHOLDINDEX is the shareholder rights 
index, FAAINDEX is the financial affairs and auditing index, DISCINDEX is the disclosure index. The model 
provides t-statistics which are in parenthesis. Coefficients are on top of parenthesis. All the control variables are 
included in the regression models but their coefficients are not reported. ***, ** and * significant at 1, 5 and 10 
percent, respectively.  
 
Panel A: The relationship between the sub-indices and ROA 
        ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
BOARDINDEX 1.269 - - - - - 
 (0.92) - - - - - 
AUCOMINDEX - 0.298         - - - - 
 -     (2.77)*** - - - - 
RECOMINDEX - - 0.281 - - - 
 - - (1.82)* - - - 
SHOLDINDEX - - - 0.259 - - 
 - - - (2.20)** - - 
FAAINDEX - - - - 0.191 - 
 - - - - (2.15)** - 
DISCINDEX - - - - - 0.154 
 - - - - - (2.11)** 
_cons -47.414 -10.819 30.043 17.768 -28.401 35.262) 
 (2.30)** (2.15)** (2.16)** (2.72)** (2.30)** (2.34)** 
R
2
 0.18 0.24 0.25 0.35 0.40 0.41 
N 244 244 244 244 244 244 
Panel B: The relationship between the sub-indices and Q 
 Q Q Q Q Q Q 
BOARDINDEX 0.055 - - - - - 
 (0.24) - - - - - 
AUCOMINDEX - 0.113 - - - - 
 - (2.22)** - - - - 
RECOMINDEX - - 0.124 - - - 
 - - (1.93)* - - - 
SHOLDINDEX - - - 0.218 - - 
 - - - (2.90)*** - - 
FAAINDEX - - - - -0.013 - 
 - - - - (0.88) - 
DISCINDEX - - - - - 0.316 
 - - - - - (2.92)*** 
_cons 14.730 -10.866 -2.649 -6.476 1.781 -2.876 
 (2.05)** (2.10)** (1.86)* (2.36)** (2.16)** (1.93)* 
R
2
 0.22 0.19 0.16 0.23 0.17 0.26 
N 244 244 244 244 244 244 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 1: Corporate governance disclosure requirements by the code, SECG and GSE 
 Disclosure Items Code SECG GSE 
B
o
a
rd
 
co
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
 
The Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer post should be separated √ × × 
The board of directors should meet at least six times a year √ × × 
The board size should be between eight and sixteen members √ × × 
The proportion of independent non-executive directors (NEDs) should represent at least one third 
of the board but not less than two of the total members of the board 
√ × √ 
There should be a finance director charged with the responsibility for the finance function √ × × 
There should be a secretary charged with the responsibility for the effective function of the board √ × × 
A
u
d
it
 C
o
m
m
it
te
e
 
Each company should establish an audit committee  √ √ √ 
The audit committee should comprise of a minimum of three directors of whom majority are 
independent NEDs 
√ × √ 
The membership of the audit committee should ideally comprise directors with adequate financial 
knowledge  
√ × × 
The chairman of the audit committee should be an independent NED √ × × 
Each company should disclose in their annual report the membership of its audit committee for 
each financial year 
√ √ × 
Each company should report on the activities of its audit committee to shareholders √ √ × 
R
em
u
n
er
a
ti
o
n
 
C
o
m
m
it
te
e
 
Each company should have a remuneration committee  √ × × 
The remuneration committee should comprise of a majority of independent NEDs √ × × 
There should be a disclosure of the remuneration committee’s membership in the annual report  √ × × 
The chairman of the remuneration committee should be an independent NED √ × × 
Each company should disclose in their annual report the aggregate amount of compensation paid 
to its directors 
√ × × 
The directors should receive part of their remuneration in stock or stock option and disclose in the 
annual report 
√ × × 
S
h
a
re
h
o
ld
er
 R
ig
h
ts
 Each company should give adequate notice and information to its shareholders prior to its Annual 
General Meeting (AGM) 
√ × √ 
Each company should allow its shareholders to approve directors re-election at the AGM √ × √ 
Each company should facilitate voting by proxy to appoint directors at the AGM √ × × 
Each company should provide the opportunity for its shareholders to vote by mail √ × × 
Each company should provide information in its annual report any related party transactions to its 
shareholders 
√ × √ 
Each company should disclose its directors share ownership in its annual report to shareholders √ × √ 
F
in
a
n
ci
a
l 
A
ff
a
ir
s 
&
 
A
u
d
it
in
g
 Each company should produce  its annual report by the legally required date √ × × 
Each company should provide information in its annual report the existence of appropriate 
systems of monitoring risk and financial governance measures 
√ × × 
Each company should disclose in its annual report the fees paid to its external auditors for audit 
and non-audit related work 
√ × × 
D
is
cl
o
su
re
 p
ra
ct
ic
es
 
Each company should include in its annual report information on its current and future prospects 
together with material risk factors  
√ × × 
Each company should disclose in its annual report a statement of responsibility by it directors of 
the preparation of the financial statements  
√ × × 
Each company should produce a statement of the adequacy of internal controls in its annual report √ × × 
Each company should disclose in its annual report a statement of the compliance with the law  √ × × 
Each company should disclose in its annual report a statement of compliance with corporate 
governance  
√ × × 
Each company should produce information on the degree of being a going concern in its annual 
report  
√ × × 
Note: The table shows a comparison of the Ghanaian Code requirements as well as the SECG and the GSE. ‘√’ indicates the required 
corporate governance disclosure by the code, SECG and the GSE and ‘×’ indicates no requirement. 
 
